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In a recent issue of the International Social
Science Journal on moralising capitalism (2005),
the contributors argued that moral norms, rules
and values can produce good economic out-
comes through the principle of non-domination
in market institutions, decentralised processes of
democratic decision-making, social self-esteem,
human rights, justice, the rule of law and
corporate ethics. While we are sympathetic to
their agenda, we are critical of their ideas for two
reasons. First, in examining
the moral fabric of the econ-
omy, several contributors
unwittingly reduced econom-
ic practices to capitalist
structures, and sometimes to
market exchanges. It is un-
doubtedly true that multina-
tionals and markets are
significant economic institu-
tions in modern industria-
lised societies, but
nevertheless we take a broad-
ermeaning of the economy to
refer to the production and
reproduction of goods and
material things to sustain life,
so that the public sector and
the household are equally
important economic institu-
tions. Feminists have long
criticised mainstream econo-
mists for neglecting the pro-
ductive nature of housework
(Folbre 1994). Second, in discussing economic
morality, several contributors treat ethics as an
external set of rules, procedures and conventions
governing economic behaviour (for an excep-
tion, see Pharo 2005).We suggest that ethics also
has internal qualities, such as individuals’
sentiments, feelings and personal character. In
The theory of moral sentiments, Adam Smith
(1976 [1790]) discusses how our sympathy for the
situations of others and our need for social
approval from impartial observers can lead to
good practices. Some contemporary moral
philosophers suggest that, as humans are inter-
dependent, vulnerable and
needy beings, care and
compassion are important
feelings that ought to be
nurtured for human well-
being (Groenhout 2004;
Nussbaum 2001; Tronto
1993). We discuss these
ideas in our analysis of the
social and economic trans-
formation in Kyrgyzstan.
The transition to a
market economy in post-
Soviet societies has raised
important questions about
the principles and values
that govern economic acti-
vities. Based on a research
project investigating social
and economic change in
Kyrgyzstan, we argue that
moral sentiments and emo-
tions, such as fear, disgust,
shame and compassion, are
important in shaping economic practices in the
public sector, social networks and markets.1 We
aim to contribute to the literature on post-Soviet
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transitions by emphasising that moral senti-
ments are vital elements in the dynamics of social
change. This article crosses disciplinary bound-
aries by engaging with the literature on post-
communism, political economy and moral
philosophy to analyse the post-Soviet moral
economy.2 More broadly, we aim to critique the
literature on political economy, which tends to
neglect the significance of moral emotions in
everyday economic practices.
Since its independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has undertaken
major economic reforms, such as large-scale
privatisation, deregulation of the public sector,
trade liberalisation and labour market reforms
(Green and Bauer 1998). In many ways the
economic strategy of shock therapy has imposed
a new liberal ethos onto decades of Soviet
practices to shape the social and economic
conditions in Kyrgyzstan. While human agents
inhabit their social and cultural structures
involuntarily, they are nevertheless evaluative
and reflexive beings, pursuing the concerns,
commitments and life projects that are signifi-
cant to their well-being, and they circumvent,
repudiate, resist and transform social con-
straints and enablement to achieve the goals
they find important (Archer 2003, pp. 135–148).
Far from being trivial or banal, human emotions
possess cognitive qualities, relate to objective
conditions, have real effects on behaviour and
motivate us to nurture our responsibilities and
care for others and to protect our own sense of
social worth (Nussbaum 2001, pp. 24–33; Sayer
2005, pp. 55–59). This article shows how the
emergent post-Soviet economic structures,
opportunities and resources, such as class struc-
ture, social inequalities, market incentives and
organisational rules, have negatively affected
human emotions, leading to a lack of compas-
sion, integrity, stigma and discrimination.
There are several accounts of the moral
economy that draw on different theoretical
traditions, from classic liberalism and neo-
Marxism to neo-Aristotelian (for a general
discussion see Booth 1994; O’Neill 1998; Sayer
2004; Sen 1999). The aim of this article is not to
offer a comprehensive literature review on the
moral economy, but to examine key perspectives
on post-Soviet societies that emphasise moral
and ethical aspects. We discuss three competing
conceptual approaches: the economic market,
the socially embedded approach and the moral
sentiments approach. The first two perspectives
are common in political economy, and the third
is located more often in moral philosophy. We
argue for a moral sentiments approach to the
post-Soviet moral economy that combines sev-
eral elements: ethical care and commitments,
moral sentiments and character and intrinsic and
instrumental values (Archer 2000, pp. 197–220;
Fevre 2003, pp. 21–25;MacIntyre 1985, pp. 187–
197; Nussbaum 2001, pp. 24–33; Sayer 2005,
pp. 111–121; Sen 1999, pp. 36–40; Smith 1976,
pp. 9–13, 109–117 [1790]). This approach offers
a conception of human beings as interdependent
and vulnerable beings who care for and care
about others, and rejects the traditional view of
individuals as rational and independent beings
subject to self-regarding concerns (Groenhout
2004, pp. 23–40; van Staveren 2001, pp. 6–24).
The article is divided into four sections. In
the first section, we discuss and evaluate three
approaches to the post-Soviet moral economy.
The next section gives some general information
about Kyrgyzstan and outlines the research
design of the project. The third section examines
the nature of the public sector, social networks
and real markets in Kyrgyzstan. Finally, we
make some concluding remarks.
Conceptualising morality in
the economy
In comparing the different approaches to under-
standing how ethical relationships and economic
practices intertwine in post-Soviet transition
societies, we state their key ideas and their impli-
cations for good practices. The three approaches
to the post-Soviet moral economy are:
1. the economic market approach, which stres-
ses the private and civilised aspects of market
exchanges;
2. the socially embedded approach, which empha-
sises collective values, rights and entitlements
3. the moral sentiments approach, which focuses
onmoral emotions, character and recognition.
The economic market approach
The early classical writers on political economy
recognised the moral ambiguity of capitalism
as societies came to develop complex social
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divisions of labour in a highly competitive environ-
ment (Hirschman 1982; O’Neill 1998). On the one
hand, individuals are free from feudal-like
bondage and hierarchical societal relationships.
In the marketplace individuals are all formally
equal and free and they develop a capacity for
making personal judgements and for being
responsible for their own actions (Booth 1994).
Indeed, liberals argue that trade and commerce
can strengthen the moral attitudes of a society as
competitive market forces tame individuals’
passions and individuals learn to honour con-
tracts, respect justice and obey the law for fear of
losing their reputation as trustworthy economic
actors. As Simmel (1955, pp. 61–64) notes, in
competitive markets the loss of income and sales
to rivals can civilise unsocial and dishonest
behaviour. Moreover, economic agents learn to
cooperate, reciprocate and take responsibility
for themselves; otherwise trust fragments, lead-
ing to the collapse of economic development.3
On the other hand, Smith (1976, pp. 61–66
[1790]) and Veblen (1918, Ch. 4) recognise that
wealth can undermine integrity, worthiness,
judgement and duties. For example, some
consumption goods can be valued because they
are conspicuous items and thus demonstrate
economic affluence rather than being enjoyed
for their intrinsic pleasures. Moreover, in a
fiercely competitive environment, individuals
may act opportunistically and break promises
and contracts for their immediate profit
(Williamson 1975). As Smith (1974 [1776], p.
232) also notes, professions can conspire
together to act against the public interest to fur-
ther their own material interest.
The economic market approach to morality
in transition economies focuses on how indivi-
dual actions are mediated through the market
system, acknowledging the latter’s liberating
and civilising effects as well as its corrosive and
destructive effects (Kaneff 2002; Liu 2003; Nee
1989; Poznanski 2000; Szelenyi and Kostello
1996). As Nee (1989) implies, this approach
suggests that as prices communicate important
information about economic costs and gains and
individuals are deemed to know what serves
their own interest, the state, as far as possible,
must establish markets and property rights to
allow individuals the freedom to exchange goods
and services. Extensive use of markets and
private property rights can generate efficient
and equitable outcomes (except in cases of
market failure, among others).
According to this approach, good practice
is when individuals pursue their own self-
interest, and, independently of others, rationally
weigh up the costs and benefits of their action
(Holton 1992, pp. 54–67). As there are real
opportunity costs to acting ethically, economic
actors have to calculate their utility by weighing
up the gains and losses. Their subjective desires
and preferences define their projects and goals
and they are moved to maximise their private
happiness. For instance, it can be argued that
sometimes in Kyrgyzstan a traffic police officer
will stop cars in the hope of extracting bribes
from drivers because it pays to do so. The officer,
who receives poor wages, is unlikely to be caught
since the monitoring and disciplinary proce-
dures are weak. Of course, unintended conse-
quences (such as letting off bad drivers and a
subsequent increase in road accidents) may
occur if officers act only to promote their own
personal gain and fail to enforce proper and safe
driving.
The socially embedded approach
Various writers, such as Polanyi (2001) and
Thompson (1971), argue that non-contractual
elements such as tacit knowledge, institutions,
rules, norms and customs shape economic
rationality and constrain self-interest. As Pola-
nyi (2001) notes, contrary to formal economics,
economic practices are socially embedded and
the economy is a process involving both market
and non-market relationships and economic and
non-economic values. In contrast to the indivi-
dualistic framework of the first perspective, this
approach argues that vested interests, collective
entities and the state vie for power and influence
to construct social conventions, policies and
agreements. The market society is conflict-
ridden and dominated by inequality, exploita-
tion and injustice.
There is an inherent tension in the socially
embedded economy. On the one hand, the
economy must be adequately embedded to
ensure effective communication, trust and co-
ordination (Granovetter 1985). For instance, a
market economy can experience an economic
crisis if there is insufficient stability and inade-
quate time for capital to realise its surplus value.
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Non-market institutions (such as the welfare
state and professional associations) and social
networks (such as kinships and clans) provide
necessary conditions for successful reproduction
and transformation of capital (O’Neill 1998, pp.
98–99). These institutions and networks ensure
formal and informal safeguards to capital
accumulation; otherwise there is too little
embedding, causing excessive labour exploita-
tion, consumer deception and fragmented ties to
endanger capital accumulation in the long run.
On the other hand, the market must
disembed social relationships, liberate economic
commitments from ossified obligations and
social habits and forge new social relationships
(Sayer 1995, pp. 88–90). Market competition
rewards successful economic creativity, innova-
tion and enterprise, at the same time as it under-
mines traditional rights, historical entitlements
and social norms.Without economic competition,
organisations, firms and communities stagnate
and decline. Economic progress and social justice
are in tension at moments such as when plant is
relocated and organisations are reformed. The
capitalist welfare state, civic institutions, profes-
sional associations and social groups need to
carefully regulate the causes and consequences of
market forces without excessively embedding the
circuit of capital (Offe 1984, pp. 48–57).
The socially embedded approach to a post-
Soviet moral economy examines how social and
political changes to civil rights, welfare entitle-
ments and social conventions have transformed
the social economy through privatisation pro-
grammes, deregulating the private sector, liber-
alising trade, labour and property laws and
marketisingthe public sector (Burawoy and
Verdery 1999; Hann 2003; Kopstein 2001;
Mandel andHumphrey 2002; Offe 1996; Verdery
1996). This approach is critical of the neo-liberal
restructuring of post-Soviet societies, pointing
out how emergent market structures, rules and
rights have weakened and constrained the well-
being of poor households, women and minority
groups (Attwood 1997; Kuehnast and Dudwick
2002; Nazpary 2002). Nevertheless, social
embeddedness is always contingent, as indivi-
duals seek to compete with each other and try to
improve their social rights and entitlements.
According to this approach, good practices
follow rules, codes of practice, social norms
and duties (see Durkheim 1957, pp. 1–41 on
professions). Furthermore, institutional safe-
guards are in place to prevent social spheres,
such as education and medicine, being domi-
nated and organised according to market
principles (Walzer 1983, pp. 6–13). As Etzioni
(1988, pp. 11–13) notes, to live well is to know
ones duty and to respect social conventions. This
does not mean that individuals become over-
socialised to norms and rules so that they are
unable to reflect upon their situation, but that
their behaviour must remain rule-bound. Moral
disorder occurs when: a) individuals fail to
adhere to the rules of the game, and behave
egoistically; and b) social goods become domi-
nated by the market, and turned into commod-
ities for money exchange.
The moral sentiments approach
The moral sentiments approach conceives of
individuals as deliberative and reflexive human
beings, who pursue ultimate concerns, have
ethical commitments and are guided by moral
sentiments (Archer 2000, pp. 197–220; Sayer
2004). Nussbaum (2001, pp. 33–33) argues that
emotions have real effects on behaviour and
relate to things that we have reason to value.
Emotions can trigger deliberate intervention and
purposeful behaviour in situations where indi-
viduals are in need, or have faced misfortunate
and deserve care. Moral emotions are as
important as economic resources and human
rights for human well-being, since emotions can
respond to individuals in vulnerable situations
and can inform and motivate social actors to
give assistance, care and support in ways that
markets and the state cannot.
Adam Smith (1976 [1790]) is careful to note
that moral behaviour can be motivated by
different emotions: positive emotions (generos-
ity, benevolence and honesty), negative emo-
tions (disgust, anger and shame) and selfish
emotions (self-love and self-deceit)4 (see Gris-
wold 1999). Disgust, pride and shame can move
individuals to withdraw from social situations
that threaten their sense of well-being. For
example, individuals can become ashamed or
angry when their dignity has been undermined
and, to avoid further stigma and humiliation,
may withdraw from the social relationships that
make them feel uncomfortable. Sometimes
emotions can have negative consequences. Citing
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Smith, Sen (1999, p. 71) argues that poor people
who feel ashamed about appearing in public, are
inhibited in participating in the community.
Immoral practices, meaning those which
harm human well-being, can also occur. Follow-
ing the human capabilities approach (Nussbaum
2000; Sen 1999), human well-being is damaged
when people lack real opportunities and positive
freedoms (i.e., capabilities) to achieve their
concerns and goals, and when their ability to
realise similar goals is unfairly allocated. This
approach to ethics is closely linked to human
rights discourse, but places more emphasis on
whether people really possess the power to
achieve their goals. Although social and political
rights may exist in a country, these rights may be
difficult to put into practice because of existing
social inequalities (Nussbaum 2000). One im-
plication of this understanding of human well-
being is that we can develop a list of cross-
cultural norms of core capabilities that can act as
a minimum threshold of human well-being. A
possible list could include being able to be
healthy, being able to have free speech and being
able to engage in various forms of social
interaction.
There are two major impediments to moral
behaviour. First, as Nussbaum (2004, p. 174)
notes, individuals can respond to situations of
tragedy and misfortune with negative emotions
such as disgust and envy. Often, a lack of
compassion betrays discrimination on the basis
of social class, position and identity. Sayer
(2005, pp. 163–167) notes that middle-class
individuals tend to feel contemptuous and
condescending towards working-class indivi-
duals, who tend to feel humiliated and stigma-
tised by and envious of those with better
material and cultural lifestyles.
Second, Smith notes how particular institu-
tions can harm us. Economic institutions such as
state monopolies and trade associations can
encourage selfish passions and work against the
public interest (1974, pp. 164, 232 [1776]). Social
institutions (such as established religion) can
cause both excessive and weak passions such as
religious fanaticism and a lack of tolerance.
Furthermore, organisational procedures, institu-
tional rules and economic targets can influence
individuals to pursue external goals to the point
of sacrificing ethical commitments and the quality
of their work (Keat 2000, pp. 81–85, 86–91).
Thus, surgeons in public hospitals may limit the
time they give to examinations and post-opera-
tion care so as to treat more patients, to satisfy
government targets and to reduce waiting time.
An important feature of the moral senti-
ments approach is that while individuals are
motivated to achieve their ultimate concerns and
ethical commitments, they also want social
status, income and power and are governed by
rules and economic targets (Sayer 2005, pp. 111–
117; Keat 2000, pp. 22–28, 111–115; Mason
1996, pp. 201–206). However, status, income,
power and rules are seen as conditioning the way
individuals engage with their ultimate concerns
and commitments, rather than being their ideals
and aspirations (see also Oakley and Cocking
2001, pp. 85–88). Smith (1976 [1790]) also argues
that moral rules can be necessary to counter the
tendency to moral corruption (self-deceit and
self-love). Rules act to guide our actions and to
enable us to reflect on our behaviour in parti-
cular situations (Griswold 1999, p. 187). While
rules such as ‘‘always treat others with equal
respect’’ can help us to focus on what matters
ethically in particular circumstances, we cannot
make use of them without an understanding of
the context, and this requires and guides
emotions, imagination and a feel for the relevant
particulars (Griswold 1999, pp. 190–192).5
According to the moral sentiments
approach, markets, organisations and commu-
nities are always a site of moral assessments and
implicit ethical commitments. As individuals
mediate incommensurable values, they must
employ practical reasoning to balance different
commitments, emotions and demands: such as
balancing integrity, honesty, praiseworthiness
and excellent practice with status, power, praise
and efficiency (Sayer 2003; van Staveren 2001).
For instance, if Kyrgyzstani lecturers are mind-
ful only of their income, promotion and reputa-
tion, then scholarly knowledge, learning and
critical thinking may suffer. Nonetheless, good
academics require a certain level of praise and
income; to claim the contrary would be deceitful.
An evaluation of the three
approaches
We offer several reasons for accepting the moral
sentiments approach. As the economic market
approach predominantly sees moral behaviour
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as a private exchange of utility, it does not
adequately conceptualise practices and relation-
ships in professional, family and community
settings, where integrity, honesty, compassion
and trust are not easily achievable, social activities
have incommensurable values, and social
encounters produce moral sentiments that affect
conduct (Smith [1790] 1976, pp. 9–13). Social
activities such as scientific work often involve
making deep commitments, obtaining recogni-
tion from significant others and doingworthwhile
acts, and they cannot be reduced to maximising
happiness or profits (O’Neill 1998, pp. 151–154).
The socially embedded approach seems to
have some plausibility in post-Soviet countries,
but its focus on rules, conventions and duties
tends to neglect the importance of reflexivity and
deliberation. While rules, conventions and tradi-
tions may instruct individual action in general
and simple circumstances, they lack sensitivity
and are too abstract and vague for complex and
highly specific everyday encounters.
The moral sentiments approach possesses
two distinct advantages (Sayer 2003, 2004).
First, emotions and reason fuse to motivate
individuals to act ethically. The motivation to
act well is as important as knowing how to act.
Where values and beliefs are shaped by an
external authority or a set of social norms and
rules, practices and relationships can become
alienating and cynical (Sayer 2005, pp. 8–9).
Second, moral emotions, reflexivity and sensi-
tivity to particulars enable individuals to make
moral judgements of their local contexts in ways
that mediate between ethical concerns and goals
and economic rewards and interests. In novel and
complex situations, moral sentiments and char-
acter motivate and guide individuals to act well.
Background information and
research design
Since the early 1990s Kyrgyzstan has been less
authoritarian than its central Asian neighbours
(Anderson 1999). It was one of the first countries
in the region to introduce pro-market reforms
and became a member of the World Trade
Organisation in 1998. Notwithstanding the
greater economic and political openness in
Kyrgyzstan today, the Kyrgyzstani political
regime has always adopted measures from the
Soviet era to control civil society. Furthermore,
political authoritarianism and clan loyalties
have exacerbated social divisions: powerful
clans and elite groups own lucrative business
assets and occupy top government posts. In
March 2005 a popular revolt, the so-called Tulip
Revolution, sparked by widespread allegations
of government interference in parliamentary
elections and fuelled by poverty and corruption,
overthrew Askar Akayev, the President, who
had been in power since independence.
Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest and most
unequal post-communist countries. There are
47.6 per cent of the people who live below the
poverty line, 13.5 per cent live in conditions of
extreme poverty and the share of total income
earned by the poorest 20 per cent of the
population is 7.6 per cent (UNDP 2002; World
Resources Institute 2006). The unemployment
rate is about 18 per cent, though in rural areas it
is much higher. In many poor households one or
more members migrate to the capital or overseas
to find better paid jobs and support the family by
sending money home. There are officially
320,000 Kyrgyzstani migrants in Russia alone,
constituting about 6 per cent of the population.
For our study we conducted semi-
structured interviews with 33 participants from
a broad spectrum of occupations who possessed
some experience of the Soviet planned economy,
and asked them questions on their views of the
transition to a market economy. The partici-
pants were chosen to cover different age groups,
ethnicities and genders, and the following were
interviewed: two doctors, three police officers,
two sex-workers, two lecturers, two lawyers, a
school teacher, an accountant, an office worker,
a factory cleaner, two NGO officers, a farmer, a
sales assistant, two housewives, a cafe´ worker,
two sports trainers, two journalists, three busi-
nesspeople, a civil servant, aUN coordinator and
two taxi drivers. Furthermore, one of the authors
worked in universities in Novosibirsk in Russia
and Bishkek inKyrgyzstan for four years and the
authors have had several years of opportunity to
observe the social life of the region.
The interviews were conducted in Russian.
All the interviews were tape-recorded, and the
participants were reassured about confidential-
ity and anonymity. On average, each interview
lasted for 45 minutes. The participants were
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either paid or given a gift for giving up their time
for the interview. The interviews were tran-
scribed and then translated into English. Sub-
sequent analysis was based on the use of
Atlas.Ti, a computer software programme for
analysing qualitative data.
The public sector, social
networks and markets
This section examines how ultimate concerns,
commitments and integrity are sometimes in
tension and conflict with economic rewards,
targets and external goals in the public sector,
social networks and real markets, and how
participants use moral sentiments and moral
rules to try to mediate between these different
values.
The public sector
As the public sector receives fewer state subsidies
and engages in cost-cutting, our interviewees in
different occupations describe how they have
come to value economic rewards at the expense
of their ethical commitments and professional
goals. On the face of it their lack of professional
commitment can be condemned as moral
corruption, but in fact the interviewees reveal
that they have a complex set of competing
ethical commitments. Natalya,6 a police officer,
suggests that the corruption in her profession is
morally acceptable in order to provide for her
family:
Natalya: The militia work mostly for money now.
Offenders may pay the militia and be released. It works
very well. You can bribe anyone. There are very few honest
people. I wish these people would think about the area of
their activities and their obligations. The militia should
Supporters of the Kyrgyz Prime Minister at a rally in Bishkek, Kyrgystan, October 2005. Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP
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protect people from offenders, and not promote an increase
in their number.
Interviewer: Why do you think those who work in the
militia changed?
Natalya: They have their own families that they need to
feed. That’s why they take bribes. Maybe, if their salary
were bigger, they would be taking fewer bribes.
As in most cases, public sector workers and
professionals justify corruption as being neces-
sary for household survival. Their sense of living
and being, theirmodus vivendi, rests upon family
commitments, rather than upon a fragile profes-
sional ethos. In prioritising their ultimate con-
cerns, they place the family first, and at times
professionalism is incompatible with adequately
meeting family responsibilities. Given the multi-
plicity of concerns, ethical evaluation defies
straightforward judgements of condemnation
or praise when assessing the ethical (mis-)con-
duct of public sector workers and professionals.
Since social relationships are intertwined, many
Kyrgyzstanis have discovered how, in trying to
pursue one dominant concern, unintended
negative consequences for other concerns
emerge. Olivier de Sardan (1999) notes that in
developing countries corruption is complex,
in part because social practices are deeply
embedded, so that it is difficult to isolate, abstract
and evaluate a single practice from the rest.
Higher education has also become a site of
struggle for balancing professional concerns and
economic rewards, as lecturers try to maintain
their professionalism in conditions of low pay,
inadequate teaching resources and poor infra-
structure. Lecturers earn on average US$40 a
month for a normal teaching workload, but this
is insufficient as a primary source of income for a
family, since an urban family needs at least
US$100, and a rural one US$60 to meet basic
costs. One survival strategy for lecturers is to
demand bribes or gifts from students for high
grades. A student poll backed by Kyrgyzstan’s
ombudsman found that out of the 520 students
polled, 54 per cent admitted to having given
lecturers sweeteners to ensure that they received
good marks (The Times Higher Educational
Supplement 2006). According to the poll, most
academics preferred cash, though 5 per cent of
students said some lecturers required them to
carry out household chores, 3 per cent said the
lecturers preferred to be entertained at expensive
restaurants, cafes and saunas, and 3 per cent said
some lecturers demanded sex from them. Asel,
a non-governmental organisation director,
describes the tariff rates for different grades:
There are a number of students who, without attending any
examination sessions get their grades for a set price.
Recently student volunteers in our organisation told me
that it costs 1,500 soms [about US$38] to pass exams with
grade 5 [excellent], 1,000 soms for grade 4 [good], 500 soms
for grade 3 [satisfactory] at [a local] university. You don’t
even have to study, you just pay the bill and get the grades,
so how can we discuss quality at all? On the other hand, I
know that these graduates will obtain good jobs as the
system of family relations is well developed and efficient.
Asel is also angry because the marketisation of
higher education gives an unfair advantage to
students from affluent backgrounds who are in a
better position to pay the lecturers and can use
their social connections to get a well-paid job.
The integrity of higher education has been
undermined as lecturers seek to make ends meet
both by working longer hours and cultivating a
culture of bribery.
What appallsmany of our interviewees is the
lack of sympathy, care and compassion of public
sector workers and professionals. Their disgust
and anger target doctors and nurses in particular.
Natalya, a police officer, and Dima, an office
worker, are both shocked at how the medical
staff disregard the well-being of their patients:
Natalya: Once my father was taken to the hospital and his
ward-mate could not pay for his medications. He had no
relatives who could help him.Hewas abandoned there.Not
a single nurse would help him until we called her a few
times. We had to call the nurses all the time to tell them to
feed the guy and give him medication, for he was virtually
dying. This happens everywhere, and even in cancer
hospitals. If a person has money to pay for medications,
they will get them. If they are poor, they won’t get any.
Dima:Doctors should remember their Hippocratic Oath,
so it’s not like if you pay – we take care of you, if you
don’t pay- you can die, we don’t care.
Natalya’s sympathy for the dying patient moti-
vated her to call the nurse and to appeal to her
sense of duty and care. On this occasion, the
nurse gave the medication. Both Natalya and
Dima are exasperated at how a fundamental
moral rule about care for patients can so easily
be ignored. It seems that Kyrgyzstani doctors
and nurses have interpreted themarket ideology,
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which informs the economic reforms in the
public sector, in ways that place the responsi-
bility of care not on them but on the patients,
their clients. It is the patients who must choose
whether they wish to purchase medical services.
This consumerist discourse shifts the other
discourses of human rights, professional ethics
and basic needs to the margins. As the market
discourse of choice, exchange and money
becomes more ingrained in the public sector
and professional services, its effects seem to have
led to unsympathetic behaviour and unjust
consequences.
Furthermore, as in higher education, non-
market institutions such as medical associations,
either do not exist or are too weak to cultivate
professional ethics and to engage critically with
market discourse. In part, the lack of effective
institutions is due to the Soviet legacy of state
control of professional groups and trade unions
together with people’s distrust of ideals of
workers solidarity.
Social networks
While social gatherings and acts of intimacy are
of fundamental concern, especially as we are
psychologically dependent on others for care,
social approval and recognition, the opportunity
cost of undertaking such activities has risen
since the removal of state subsidies for basic
goods and services and the increase in
unemployment. For lack of economic resources,
poor households limit their social contacts to
avoid being shamed and humiliated in public
(Kuehnast and Dudwick 2002). Many intervie-
wees are upset at how their relationships
with friends and acquaintances have changed,
as increasing costs have meant cutting back on
social gatherings.
Tamara (a kiosk sales assistant): Before, we used to see each
other more frequently at birthday parties and celebrations,
but now we meet only if they celebrate an anniversary.
Interviewer: And why is that so?
Tamara: It is because living is more difficult now.
Previously groceries were cheaper, everybody had a table
full of food, now there are only white potatoes and bread.
It is uncomfortable to visit others; they may start
thinking we are visiting them too often, besides Kyrgyz
people have large families.
Interviewer: Why would they think you are visiting them
too often?
Tamara: It is just not right; of course we would not go
there empty-handed. In the past, people would not think
you were visiting them too often; everybody visited each
other frequently, they would travel all the way up to
Naryn [region], and sometimes even once a week. But
now that happens only two to three times a year, and only
for celebrations or weddings.
Tamara is upset that she and other poor
individuals have to reduce their social contacts
so as to avoid possible humiliating situations of
arriving empty-handed. Nevertheless, poor
households are committed to close family
members, since concern for the family is deeply
rooted. This strong sense of commitment marks
the domestic sphere as an exceptional relation-
ship, resistant to economic pressures.
Real markets
Hirschman (1982) argues that commerce and
competition can act as a moralising agent. In the
process of trading individuals learn to be honest
and prudent so as not to damage their credit-
worthiness and reputation. Liberal markets
appear to foster various ethical values including
formal equality, autonomy and freedom, and in
them individuals are encouraged to be more
responsible and to pursue their own goals. Aida,
a lawyer, discusses how the transition to a
market economy has affected Kyrgyzstanis’
capacity to pursue their own interests in more
‘‘civilised’’ ways.
Now we have something close to civilised business, but
earlier [just after the collapse of communism] everybody
was ready to cheat everyone else, even their own mothers,
for the sake of profit. Now the market dictates different
conditions and a reliable partner means a lot. Earlier,
everybody thought only about himself and lived from day
to day. Nowadays people think about the future, about
their image. If you show yourself to be unreliable, then you
are as good as dead – no partners, no reputation!
In contrast, most citizens under the Soviet
system had very little control over their pur-
chases in the formal economy and they were
poorly motivated to work. Nevertheless, they
participated in the informal or underground
economy to obtain the consumer goods they
wanted through giving bribes (blat), doing
favours for friends and acquaintances and
cheating and deceiving officials. Aida, who lived
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formuch of her life under the Soviet regime, feels
that people are now more honest.
However, competitive capitalistic markets
can just as easily foster a culture of dishonesty
and corruption and reinforce exploitative and
unequal power relations in the economy. While
abstract markets can in theory operate according
to the liberal principles of freedom and equality,
real markets aremore complex, since they involve
and presuppose non-market relationships that
are contingent on and reflect historical, cultural
and political pressures (Polanyi 2001). InKyrgyz-
stan, the social embeddedness of markets reflects
illiberal social processes and institutions. Many
political scientists such as Collins (2002) describe
how elite clans, criminal organisations and
powerful political families influence the Kyrgyz-
stani polity and economy.BeforeAskarAkayev’s
13-year regime was overthrown in the popular
uprising in March 2005 it was widely reported in
the opposition newspapers that he and his family
had accumulated a massive personal fortune
through shareholdings in large businesses and
that major economic contracts were often
awarded to his friends and clan members to
shore up their political loyalty and support.
Furthermore, the tradition of Soviet prac-
tices of giving bribes and asking for ‘‘gifts’’ (blat)
continues to affect economic relationships (Le-
deneva 1998, pp. 206–214). Many Kyrgyzstanis
have adapted blat to the new market conditions
by demanding bribes and offering gifts to ensure
that contracts are awarded. Many interviewees
note that real markets are riddled with bribes
and social connections. Gulzat, a housewife and
formerly a nurse, describes how her brother had
to give a bribe for her husband to get a job:
Market relations describe everything: if youdon’t give a bribe,
you won’t find a good job.When my husband was getting his
job, my older brother gave away his colt to help him with
his job. We do not regret that we gave away the horse.
Both Aida and Gulzat point to an important
understanding of markets: whether real markets
encourage trustworthiness or facilitate dishon-
esty depends on how social institutions, norms,
customs and rules affect concrete markets and
how individuals evaluate economic success and
integrity in their particular context. Real mar-
kets are always a site of moral assessments and
implicit ethical commitments.
Some writers (such as Kaneff 2002) suggest
that market trading is shameful because during
the Soviet period trade was condemned as
spekulatsiya (profiteering), and was seen as an
exploitative and unproductive form of generat-
ing wealth. In some parts of Eastern Europe and
the Caucasus, the Soviet legacy of condemning
and having a low regard for market trading
continues to affect marketplaces, and traders are
ashamed of their activities. However, amongst
our interviewees there was no expression of
shame about market trading, or any mention of
condemning spekulatsiya. In Kyrgyzstan, shut-
tle-trading can sometimes be seen as exciting
since traders travel to Europe, India, China or
Turkey to procure designer clothes, perfumes
and jewellery. Kyrgyzstan has one of the largest
indoor marketplaces in central Asia located in
the capital, Bishkek.
Instead we observed that shame and
embarrassment are often expressed by pensioners,
old women and professionals who are forced to
sell produce from their garden allotments or bits
of their belongings, such as books and Soviet
medals, to passers-by.7 These causal sellers are
located on street corners, outside their homes
and on the fringes of large marketplaces and are
pushed into selling bric-a-brac and foodstuffs
because they cannot make ends meet on their
low state salary or monthly pension. The sellers
are embarrassed to have to bare their suffering
and hardship so openly in public, and would
prefer to have a decent state income. Their
shame reflects their suffering and their inability
to live well, rather than going against cultural
norms about spekulatsiya.
Nevertheless, the market system can evoke
negative emotions such as anger and shame, in
other ways. The market system caters for the
social classes who have the wealth and income to
exercise consumer choice, but it ignores poorer
groups, who have insufficient means to make
their wants count. In capitalist societies, an
uneven class structure often affects real markets.
Asel, the non-governmental organisation direc-
tor, describes her frustrationwith amarket system
that cares little for vulnerable and poor groups:
[During the Soviet times], there was a lack of groceries and
industrial goods, so in order to buy footwear we had to find
friends – this was normal practice. Or on the eve of
holidays, special stores would be closed to serve the cream
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of the society. But, now I can purchase those items in any
kiosk. I give my total support to the system in this respect,
though it is another matter when people do not have the
money to buy goods or to support their children.We have a
new puzzle: in the past, we had the money, but there were
no goods to buy, and nowwe have the goods, but nomoney
to buy them. We have gone from one extreme to another.
In criticising the market system Asel is not
being nostalgic about the Soviet days since she
recognises that the old regime was corrupt.
Rather she rightly argues that markets are
affected by economic and social inequalities,
causing disappointment and hurt. The transition
to a market economy has left many vulnerable,
poor and needy groups without the capabilities
to achieve human well-being.
Concluding remarks
The article discussed three competing approaches
to the post-Soviet moral economy. One major
weakness of the economic market approach is
that it views human beings as largely driven by
selfish motives. In fact we are vulnerable and
needy beings who must care for and be cared for
by others outside the marketplace. While the
socially embedded approach acknowledges that
economic behaviour involves rules, rights and
norms, we have shown how moral emotions,
commitments and character matter in making
moral judgements on how to live. The moral
sentiments approach offers a better understanding
of humanagents as reflexive beingswhodeliberate
on ways to pursue their ultimate concerns,
commitments and life projects. In making moral
assessments of their local contexts, moral senti-
ments inform and motivate individuals to balance
internal values (integrity, justice, worthiness,
professionalism and equality) with external goals
(income, power, status and targets). Moral
sentiments are relational, involving our depen-
dence on and care for others and cannot be
thought of as subjective whims and irrational
preferences, or as ideological false consciousness,
though we can make mistakes about their causes,
consequences and significance.
In our study on Kyrgyzstan, we saw how
material interests and economic structures
(including opportunity costs, competition and
inequalities) affected the public sector, social
networks and real markets, creating tensions
between internal and external values and under-
mining social dignity. In particular, we showed
how markets and social inequalities affected
moral sentiments, ethical valuations and com-
mitments. Among these, for instance, are the
market’s civilising effects, the shame arising
from poverty and economic concerns that make
it necessary to sideline care and responsibilities.
We have suggested that poor individuals
have good reasons to be frustrated and angry
and to fear for their well-being. They lack real
human agency and capabilities. Inequalities and
poverty have deprived Kyrgyzstanis of valuable
activities and goods, such as decent employ-
ment, quality education, good health, caring
relationships, social worth and respect. Lacking
human capabilities and operating in harsh
economic conditions, since independence most
Kyrgyzstanis have had to sacrifice their profes-
sional and work commitments to make ends
meet, to restrict their participation in social
networks and to endure shame in scratching a
living. The popular revolt inMarch 2005 showed
both their frustration and anger at the present
social system, and their desire and hope for
something better.
We hope that this article will motivate others
to join in the debate on how everyday normativity
interrelates with post-Soviet economies, as a
contribution to forging a normative social science.
Notes
1. The research project was
funded by the American
University, Central Asia Research
Grant Committee and the
University of Kent Social Science
Faculty Grant Committee. We are
grateful to Chris Pickvance, Sarah
Amsler, Vanessa Ruget, Tatiana
Yarkova and Iain Wilkinson for
their constructive comments and
support. Our thanks to Mehrigiul
Ablezova, Emil Juraev and Asyl
Bakanova for their contribution
to the study. Finally, we would
like to express our gratitude to the
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interviewees for their time,
guidance and patience. The usual
disclaimers apply.
2. A moral economy is defined as
an object and a kind of inquiry
that focus on how economic
activities of all kinds are
influenced and structured by
moral dispositions, values and
norms, and how these in turn are
reinforced, shaped, compromised
or overridden by economic
pressures (Sayer 2004, p. 2).
3. Note that moral emotions play
a role in this approach. While the
three approaches to the moral
economy are distinct in their core
ideas, they do overlap.
4. Smith points out it is not
thanks to the benevolence of
baker, brewer and butcher that we
get our dinner, but from our
appeal to their self-interest (1976
[1774], pp. 118–119]).
5. MacIntyre (1985, p. 191,
p. 194) also notes that while
institutions and external goods,
such as power, income and status,
help to sustain social practices, in
the absence of moral emotions
and virtues social practices cannot
resist the corrupting power of
external demands.
6. The names of the participants
have been changed to ensure
anonymity.
7. We are grateful to Rachel
Marcus for bringing this to our
attention.
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